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Improving Adversarial Transferability via Neuron Attribution-Based Attacks

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arxiv 2204.00008 v1 pith:PM5YX2WD submitted 2022-03-31 cs.LG cs.CR

Improving Adversarial Transferability via Neuron Attribution-Based Attacks

classification cs.LG cs.CR
keywords attacksneuronfeature-leveladversarialattackmodeltransferabilityattribution
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. It is thus imperative to devise effective attack algorithms to identify the deficiencies of DNNs beforehand in security-sensitive applications. To efficiently tackle the black-box setting where the target model's particulars are unknown, feature-level transfer-based attacks propose to contaminate the intermediate feature outputs of local models, and then directly employ the crafted adversarial samples to attack the target model. Due to the transferability of features, feature-level attacks have shown promise in synthesizing more transferable adversarial samples. However, existing feature-level attacks generally employ inaccurate neuron importance estimations, which deteriorates their transferability. To overcome such pitfalls, in this paper, we propose the Neuron Attribution-based Attack (NAA), which conducts feature-level attacks with more accurate neuron importance estimations. Specifically, we first completely attribute a model's output to each neuron in a middle layer. We then derive an approximation scheme of neuron attribution to tremendously reduce the computation overhead. Finally, we weight neurons based on their attribution results and launch feature-level attacks. Extensive experiments confirm the superiority of our approach to the state-of-the-art benchmarks.

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