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I Know What You See: Power Side-Channel Attack on Convolutional Neural Network Accelerators

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arxiv 1803.05847 v2 pith:O5ZKOJRF submitted 2018-03-05 cs.CV cs.LG

I Know What You See: Power Side-Channel Attack on Convolutional Neural Network Accelerators

classification cs.CV cs.LG
keywords attackdeeplearningnetworkneuralpowerconvolutionalimage
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Deep learning has become the de-facto computational paradigm for various kinds of perception problems, including many privacy-sensitive applications such as online medical image analysis. No doubt to say, the data privacy of these deep learning systems is a serious concern. Different from previous research focusing on exploiting privacy leakage from deep learning models, in this paper, we present the first attack on the implementation of deep learning models. To be specific, we perform the attack on an FPGA-based convolutional neural network accelerator and we manage to recover the input image from the collected power traces without knowing the detailed parameters in the neural network. For the MNIST dataset, our power side-channel attack is able to achieve up to 89% recognition accuracy.

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Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score.

  1. Open DNN Box by Power Side-Channel Attack

    cs.CR 2019-07 unverdicted novelty 6.0

    Power side-channel analysis recovers DNN architecture and parameters at 96.5% average accuracy on real embedded devices.