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USBSnoop -- Revealing Device Activities via USB Congestions

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arxiv 2503.03980 v2 pith:2MICVC7N submitted 2025-03-06 cs.CR

USBSnoop -- Revealing Device Activities via USB Congestions

classification cs.CR
keywords securityside-channelstandardattackscongestioncriticaldevicesneed
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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The USB protocol has become a ubiquitous standard for connecting peripherals to computers, making its security a critical concern. A recent research study demonstrated the potential to exploit weaknesses in well-established protocols, such as PCIe, and created a side-channel for leaking sensitive information by leveraging congestion within shared interfaces. Drawing inspiration from that, this project introduces an innovative approach to USB side-channel attacks via congestion. We evaluated the susceptibility of USB devices and hubs to remote profiling and side-channel attacks, identified potential weaknesses within the USB standard, and highlighted the critical need for heightened security and privacy in USB technology. Our findings discover vulnerabilities within the USB standard, which are difficult to effectively mitigate and underscore the need for enhanced security measures to protect user privacy in an era increasingly dependent on USB-connected devices.

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