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When "Better" is better than "Best"
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When "Better" is better than "Best"
classification
econ.TH
cs.GT
keywords
betterconvergedynamicsplayerassumedbestbest-responsebetter-response
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We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the better-response dynamics converge to pure Nash equilibrium whenever there is one, whereas best-response dynamics fails to converge, as it is trapped.
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